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In the Supreme Court of 
The State of Utah 
GENERAL TALKING PICTURES CORP'ORA-
TION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NAIDA L. HYATT, as Executrix of the Est~te of CIVIL 
E. H. Littlejohn, who is the same person as Elsie No. 7170 
Haas Littlejohn, and JAMES COCHRAN LIT-I 
TLEJOHN, as administrator with will annexed ofj · 
the Estate of William Littlejohn, deceased, 
Defendants. 
CR.espondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree that the statement of facts con-
tained in the appellant's brief is substantially correct. 
The company is the plaintiff in this action. The "Ex-
hibitor" refers to E. H. Littlejohn and William Littlejojhn, 
both deceased, who died on the 8th day of May, 1942, and 
the 14th day of June, 1944, respectively. 
For convenience appellant will hereinafter be referred 
to as plaintiff, and respondents as defendants, and E·. H. 
Littlejohn and William Littlejohn as decedents. 
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding 
that plaintiff's claim as presented to the defendants was 
not accompanied by a copy of the written Agreement upon 
which the claim was founded, or that such copy was not 
presented with said claim. (Finding No. 14; J.R. p. 47 & 48) 
that plaintiff should be sustained in its contention because 
it alleged that the claim was "duly presented" (J. R. p~ 2; 
par. 12), and that nowhere is that allegation denied, but 
that on the contrary, the defendants admit in thedr 
Amended Answer to par. 12 of plaintiff's Complaint "that 
the plaintiff presented to each a purported claim in said 
estates." (J. R. p. 24). 
We cannot agree with the plaintiff's argument to the 
effect that when plaintiff alleged that a cl~im was "duly 
presented" in each of said estates, it in effect alleged that a 
copy of the Agreement upon which the claim was based 
was attached to the claim as presented. Plaintiff agrees 
that a claim based upon a written instrument to be regu-
larly presented, must be accompanied by a copy of-such in-
strument, but counsel for plaintiff take the position that 
the word "duly" implies "the existence of ·every fact essen .. 
tial to perfect regularity of procedure." (19 C. J.p. 833). 
D·efendants d~nied generally and specifically that said 
claim was "duly" presented. In par. 10 of their Amended 
Answer (J. R. p. 24), the defendants admit only that the 
plaintiff presented to each of them a purported claim in 
said. estates. Defendants did not admit that plaintiff "duly" 
presented said claim. D·efendants, in their Amended An-
swer, denied specifically and generally each and every al-
legation in said par. 12 contained, not therein specifically 
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admitted or denied. (J. R. p. 24). Since defendants admit 
only the presentation of a "purported claim," and not that 
it was "duly" presented, and since the other allegations in 
said paragraph were denied, the defendants denied that said 
claim \vas "duly" presented.· 
After evidence duly presented, the court found that 
the plaintiff presented its claims "but did not accompany or 
present with said claims, or either of them, a copy of the 
written Agreement upon which the same was and is founded 
or based." (J. R. p. 48). 
Section 102-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides, 
among other things, that: 
• 
"all claims arising upon contract whether the same 
are due, not due, or contingent, must be presented 
within the time limited in the notice, and any 
claim not presented is barred forever;-" 
Section 102-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, on the 
subject of the contents of a claim, provides, _among other 
things, as follows : 
"If the claim is founded on a bond, bill, note, or any 
other instrument, a copy of such instrument must 
acco:r_npany the claim,-" · 
The plaintiff did not make a prima facie case against 
the defendants because of the deficiency in its claim in said 
particular, and· the court has specifically found against the 
plaintiff on the fact involved. The matter of a claim was 
litigated in the lower court. The plaintiff cannot challenge 
the sufficiency of the evidence because it has failed to bri~g 
up the bill of exceptions in the case, and is therefore bound 
by the finding of the court as made. 
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However, even if the defentants had admitted that 
said claims were "duly" presented, this would not aid the 
plaintiff for the reason that in pleading, the word "duly" 
imports but a conclusio"n relating only to the formalities 
observed and non-observed and tenders no issue. (See 28 
C. J. S. p. 586). (Emphasis ours.) 
In Miles v McDermott, 31 Cal. 27 4, the court says : 
''Such words as 'duly,' 'wrongfully,' and 'unlaw-
fully' so frequently used in pleadings, might bet-
ter be omitted. They tender no issue." 
To the same effect see Going v. Dinwiddie, 86 Cal. 633, 
25 P. 129. In Stott v. City of Chicago, ~ N. E. 736, a petition 
for mandamus· to compel petitioner's restoration to the office 
of police patrolman, alleged that petitioner was duly ap-
pointed to the office without alleging the passage of any 
ordinance fixing the number of patrolmen or providing for 
their appointment or election. The court held the allegation 
that the petitioner was duly appointed to the office was in-
sufficient as an allegation as to the manner of petitioner's 
appointment, the allegation being a legal conclusion. (Em-
phasis is ours.) 
Counsel for the plaintiff in his brief cites 19 C. J. p. 
833 in support of his contention in this matter. He neglected 
however to quote the following language from the very 
citation above quoted and cited by plaintiff, to-wit: 
"In pleading, the term imports but a conclusion 
relating only to the formalities observed or non-
observed, and tenders no issue. While it does not 
vitiate a pleading, it is surplusage, and had better 
be omitted." ' 
See Words and Phrases, First Series, Vol. 3, p. 2259 : 
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''The word 'duly,' as used in an averment that plaintiff is 
duly incorporated, imports but a conclusion . . ." 
In a tax refund suit, an allegation that the refund 
claim was "duly filed" was held merely a legal conclusion, 
and for the purpose of demurrer, said words must be treated 
as not showing when refund claim was filed. (James A. 
Hearn & Son v. U. S., 8 Fed. Supp. 698, certiorari denied, 55 
S. Ct. 550, 294 U. S. 722, 79 L. Ed. 1254. 
It will be noted from all the authorities above cited that 
the words "duly presented," or "duly filed" and phrases of 
like import, are nothing but mere conclusions and tender no 
issue. Certainly, it would be a strained construction, to say 
the least, to hold that the words "duly presented" in this 
case mean that the claim presented to each/estate herein 
was accompanied by a copy of the written Agreement be-
tween the plaintiff and the decedents. However, we have 
denied generally and specifically in our Amended Answer 
that said claims were "duly" presented, even if such phrase 
would permit such unwarranted meaning. 
Plaintiff, on p. 6 of its brief, makes the claim that the 
defendants "admitted that plaintiff duly presented a 'pur-
ported' claim." This is not true. There is no such language 
in our Amended Answer, and our Amended Answer is not 
subject to such construction. In fact our Answer does not 
use the word "duly" at all in regard to said claim, but denies 
specifically and generally the portion of the plaintiff's 
Complaint in which it alleges that the claim was ''duly" 
presented. (J. R. p. 24, par. 10.) 
We are also unable to concur in plaintiff's assertion 
that a purported claim is a sufficient and statutory claim, 
nor can we agree with counsel that the cases cited on p. 6 
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of his Brief sustain the proposition that a purported claim 
is a sufficient and statutory claim. We have examined said 
authorities cited on p. 6, and find that none of them sus-
tain phiintiff's contention. Most of said cases simply con-
strue statutes in which the word "purport" is used, and 
the courts seem to adopt the definition of said word con-
tained in Webster's N e\v International Dictionary to the 
effect that ·said word means "To have the appearance or 
convey the impression of being, meaning, or signifying some 
particular thing; to mean or seem to mean or intend." 
It will be noted that some of the cases cited are criminal 
cases in which this word is construed, but we do not find 
in said cases any ;.statement to the effect that a purported 
claim is a sufficient and statutory claim, and none of said 
cases are authority for the proposition which counsel con-
tends for in this case. 
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 
Under this Assignment, plaintiff claims that the trial 
court erred in making the following finding, to-wit: "that 
more than six years prior to the commencement of this 
action, the plaintiff elected to terminate, and did terminate 
" 
said Agreement ... " (Finding No. 12; J. R. p. 46). Plain-
· tiff( complains that said purported finding is not a finding 
of fact, but a conclusion of law. The writer of plaintiff's 
Brief states that he has ,not been able to find any case 
which has adjudicated this question with respect to the 
word "termination" or "terminated." We wish to cite two 
California cases wherein similar findings containing the 
word "terminated" were h.eld to be findings of ultimate 
fact and not conclusions of law. See Centrai Heights Im-
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pro_yement Co. v. Memorial Parks, Calif., 105 P. 2d 596. In 
that case an action was brought to recover the unpaid pur-
chase price alleged to be due under a contract for the sale 
of realty for cemetery purposes. The defendant corpora-
tion alleged that its only contract with plaintiff changed 
the terms of a previous agreement between the plaintiff 
and the promoter. The trial court made a finding that 
plaintiff's contract with the corporation "terminated and 
cancelled" the prior contract. Held: This finding constituted 
a finding of an ultimate fact and was within the issues pre-
sented by the pleadings. 
See also Capital National Bank of Sacramento v. Smith, 
144 P. 2d 665, 672 (Cal.) In this case the appeUant Barbara 
de Bles challenged Finding No. 12 as a conclusion of law. 
The court said : 
"The challenged finding specifically determines 
that the defendant Barbara de Bles defaulted in 
petformance of the terms, covenants, and .condi-
tions of the Smith-de Bles Agreement, and that 
Smith terminated that contract on January 24, 
1940, on that account; that all of the rights of said 
defendant under the contract were thereby term-
inated, and that she thereafter held no assignable 
or other interest in said property. Finding No. 12 
is a sufficient determination of the ultimate facts 
to the effect that the contract of Barbara de Bles, 
dated September 27, 1936, was terminated for 
breach of covenants to pay installments at speci-
fied times . . ." 
We cite also: Nuttal v. Holman, (Utah) 173 P. 2d, 1015, 
wherein the trial court made findings to the effect that the 
plaintiff "abandoned" his contract. This court held the 
findings were within the issues of the answ!er alleging that 
plaintiff promised to pay the full purchase price on a 
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specified day, and failed /to do so. We submit that there is 
little difference betw,een a finding that plaintiff "aband-
oned" his contract and a finding that a plaintiff "elected to 
terminate and did terminate" its agreement. We believe 
that under the circumstances both findings are of ultimate 
facts and are not conclusions of law. 
Finally, we call the court's attention to the case of 
Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 U. 50, 56; 137 P. 2d, 819, 822, where-
in it is stated that the Supreme Court should not be techni-
cal in requiring a trial court to make refined separations be-
tw~een findings of fact and conclusions of law, especially 
where the basis for the so-called findings clearly appears in 
the findings. See also Wright v. Lee, 104 U. 90; 138 P. 2d 
246. 
Plaintiff argues secondly· that the said finding is erron-
ous for the reason that it i_s. outside the issues raised by the 
pleadings, and that this is an affirative matter for the de-: 
fendants to plead. The plaintiff is in court only on the 
Judgment Roll. Evidence was introduced in the trial court 
\ 
on the question pf termination, and said matter was speci-
fically involved in the pleading of the statutes of limita-
tions. The Reply of the plaintiff alleges that approximately 
74 letters were written to the decedents, (J. R. p. 39) and 
gives the dates thereof. The court found in part as follows: 
"That in each of said letters plaintiff demanded 
payment of the sum due it from the decedents 
under paragraph 5A of the Agreement, and in 
some of said letters the plaintiff demanded the 
return of it by the decedents of said phonofilm 
and equipment; that the dates of the letters in 
which the plaintiff demanded of the decedents that 
they return the said phonofilm and equipment to 
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New York Citv are as follows- (dates given)." (J. R. p. 47.) ~ 
We also wish to call the court's attention to the fact 
that after the filing of the plaintiff's Reply alleging the 
sending of all of said letters to the decedents, which said 
Reply is dated May 10, 1946, (J. R. p. 40), the defendants 
filed a "Supplement to Amended Answer of Naida L. Hyatt, 
and Amended Answer of James Cochran Littlejohn" on May 
14, 1946 (J. R. p. 37), in which the defendants plead the 
bar of the statutes of limitations. This supplement pleads 
that the plaintiff's alleged cause or causes of action, are 
barred by the statutes of limitations (J. R. p. 37). All of 
these matters, together with the evidence introduced, re-
sulted in the court making the finding "that more than 
six years prior to the commencement of this action~ the 
plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate said Agree-
ment-" (Finding 12; J. R. p. 46). 
The plaintiff's demands for the return of said equip-
ment and its right to the same are involved in and connected 
with the question of the tennination of the Agreement. The 
plaintiff was not entitled to the return of the equipment 
without its termination of the Agreement. The court has 
made complete findings of fact on these matters. This court 
is bound by said findings, appeal being only on the Judg-
ment Roll. 
Defendants contend that even if it were determined 
that said finding is outside the issues raised by the plead-
ings, this objection is not available to the plaintiff for the 
reason that the finding is amply supported by the evidence. 
Since plaintiff brings this appeal upon the Judgment Roll 
orily, and since the evidence is not before this court and 
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cannot be considered by it, this Assignment is not available 
to the pl~intiff. See Stephens v. Doxey, 62 Utah 241, 218 P. 
965. In that case, the appellant complained that a certain 
finding of the court was based on a matter outside the 
pleadings, and hence was not made an issue in the case. 
This court held that .appellant's objection was without 
merit, where it was not asserted that the finding was with-
out evidence to support it, or that such evidence was ob-
jected to. See also lVIoyle v. McKean, 49 Utah 93, 162, P. 63, 
65, wherein this court held an assignment of error that a 
finding was not, within the allegations of a complaint will be 
overruled, where, though there were no allegations in the 
comlaint in the precise form of the finding, it was fairly 
within the purview ~f the allegations and responsive 
thereto~ 
The authorities also appear to hold that even in the 
absence of specific allegations of certain matters, if evi-
dence is introduced on such matters, the court may make 
a finding thereon. See Starkweather v. Eddy, (Cal.) 261, P. 
763, which was an action for the recovery of money. The 
complaint contained no specific allegations of fraud, but evi-
dence of fraud was introduced. The California court held 
in that case that the trial court could find on the question 
of fraud, even though it was not alleged, since evidence was 
introduced thereon. 
The case of Taylor v. Taylor, 218 P. 756 (Calif.) is to 
the effect that issues which arise from the evidence, and 
which are not directly made by allegations in the pleadings 
should be found upon. 
It is our contention that the pleadings do raise the 
issue of termination of the contract, but that in any event, 
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evidence was introduced thereon, and the court was war-
ranted in making the finding to which plaittiff objects. 
And further, that appellant's objection is without merit, 
because it has not and can not assert that the finding of the 
court on this matter was without evidence to support it or 
that the evidence introduced on the question was objected to 
by appellant. It has appealed only on the judgment _roll. 
The plaintiff in its brief states that it believes that 
the case of Neuberger vs. Robbins, 37 Utah 197, 106 P. 933, 
is absolutely "determinative" of this question. We have 
read this case carefully and while the quoted portion from 
the opinion in counsel's brief is correct, the case is not an 
authority for the proposition claimed for by the plaintiff. 
The second syllabus in the Pacific report of said case is very 
accurate in stating the holding of the case. Said syllabus is, 
as follows: 
"Where a seller sued for the balance due on a con-
tract, on the theory that he had performed the con-
tract binding him to sell and deliver the amount 
of ~heat he then 'had on hand, and the undisputed 
evidence showed that he had on hand 2,163 bush-
els, and that he delivered only 1,1421/2 bushels, a 
finding that the seller had fully performed his part 
of the contract was unauthorized." 
The plaintiff's brief, at Page 10, after discussing the 
Neuberger Case, proceeds with a discussion of the letters 
and state~, among other things, as follows: "Unless these 
letters are calculated to have effected the termination of 
'said Agreement-' the trial Court has made no conclusion 
respecting them." If the Bill of Exceptions had been brought 
to this Court by the plaintiff, it could be easily determined 
that the Court concluded from all of the evidence, includ-
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ing the letters, that the. plaintiff had elected to terminate 
.and did terminate said Agreement more than six years prior 
to the commencement of this action. 
Plaintiff's brief also states on page 11 thereof, as fol-
lows: "It must be noted that the plaintiff, alone, could ter-
minate the contract prior to November 19, 1941, and then 
only upon the happening of certain events." Pl~intiff did 
elect to terminate and did terminate said contract prior to 
1941 and more than six years prior to the commencement 
of this action as found by the Court. If the plaintiff had 
brought up the Bill of Exceptions, this matter could have 
been determined by this court. In the absence of the Bill 
of Exceptions, the finding must be against the plaintiff. 
. A copy of the Agreement sued upon is attached to the 
plaintiff's Complaint, (J. R. pp. 4-7). Said Agreement pro-
vides in part, as follows: 
"14.-Th~s license shall be. for a period of ten (10) 
years from the date hereof but may be sooner ter-
minated by the Company upon the happening. of 
any, of the following events: · · 
... "The failure or refusal for a ·period of three 
days to pay any sum or sums of money now or 
hereafter due, by acceleration or otherwise, to be 
paid hereunder by the Exhibitor, and in this re-
spect time shall be of the essence." (J. R. p. 5). 
The Findings of Fact state in part, as follows: 
''(a) That said Agreement provides that Elsie Haas 
Littlejohn and William Littlejohn pay to the plain-
tiff the sum of 'Fifty Dollars ($50.00) annually· 
during the term of this license, the first payment 
commencing one (.1) year from the date hereof'; 
that the date of said Agreement is the 19th day 
of November, 1931; that the said Elsie Haas Lit-
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tlejohn and William Littlejohn and the defendants 
herein have failed and neglected to pay to the 
plaintiff said annual installments of Fifty Dollars 
($50.00) each and have failed and neglected to pay 
to the plaintiff any of said annual instalhnents." 
(J. R. p. 4.5). 
The first annual Fifty Dollar payment due from the dece-
dents to the plaintiff became due on the 19th day of No-
vember, 1931. Said payment was not made. An additional 
Fifty Dollar installment became due from the decedents to 
the plaintiff yearly thereafter. None of said installments 
were made. (J. R. p. 45). The plaintiff, three days after 
the decedents failed to make the first payment, had the 
right to terminate said Agreement. The Court in its Find-
ings of Fact found that the plaintiff on July 9th, 1935; 
August 27, 1935; D-ecember 28, 1936; February 1, 1937; 
. . 
April 30, 1937; August 7, 1937; November 16, 1937; April 
6, 1938; May 26, 1938; July 14, 1938; October 12, 1938; June 
9, 1939; September 25, 1939; November 13, 1939; January 
10, 1940; February 17, 1940; July 31, 1940; December 2, 
1940; January 30, 1941; July 16, 1942 and March 1, 1943 
demanded of the decedents that they return sa~d phonofilm 
and equipment to the plaintiff in New York City (J. R. p. 
47). Under the terms and provisions of said Agreement, 
the plaintiff had no right to the return to it of said phono-
film and equipment without it having elected to terminate 
said Agreement. From the contents of said letters and the 
ether evidence introduced before the lower Court, the Court 
made the finding "that more than six years prior to the 
commencement of this action, the plaintiff elected to termi-
nate and did terminate said Agreement ~ - -'~, Finding 12, 
( J. R .. p. 46) . This finding is one of an ultimate fact and 
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can not be disturbed by the appellate Court on an appeal 
vvhich is mer.ely on the Judgment Roll. The Court agreed 
~rith the plaintiff that the plaintiff is the only one that had 
the right to terminate said Agreement, but found that 
the plaintiff had elected to terminate and did terminate 
said Agreement more than six years prior to the com-
mencement of this action. The plaintiff's example of a 
Promissory Note payable to the plaintiff in annual install-
ments over a period of ten years is not analogous to the 
situation involved in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff contends that in any event in this action 
it is entitled to recover the last two Fifty Dollar annual 
installments. We submit that after the plaintiff elected to 
terminate said Agreement it could not collect any additional 
annual installments. 
32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 875, states, as 
follows: 
"On the other hand, a forfeiture which the lessor 
elects to assert terminates the lease and with it all 
obligations, covenants, and stipulations in the lease 
dependent upon the continuance of the term . 
. Thus, as a general rule the lessee is relieved from 
liability for subsequently accruing rents, in the 
absence of a stipulation in the lease for his con-
tinued liability, and although. the lessee refuses 
to surrender possession after a forfeiture, the les-
sor cannot recover rent subsequently falling due 
while the lessee continues possession; his remedy 
in such a case is an action for damages for the 
lessee's wrongfully withholding possession." 
The Agreement between the parties also provides in 
part, as follows: 
"18-Upon the expiration or sooner termination of 
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this license for any reason whatsoever or the 
abandonment by the Exhibitor of the Theatre 
- - - - - -, the Exhibitor, at its own cost and ex-
pense, shall surrender and deliver up possession 
of the Equipment to the Company at its factory 
in good order and condition, reasonable wear and 
tear excepted, - - - - -:- -" (J. R .. p. 6). 
Plaintiff states at page 13 of its brief discussing this 
matter, as follo·w·s: "Apparently the defendants and the 
trial court take the view that such abandonment did ter-
minate the agreement". Plaintiff argues that the decedents 
could not terminate their obligation under said Agreement 
by abandoning the Lyric Theatre and that it would take 
some affirmative act on the part of the plaintiff to termi-
nate said Agreement after the abandonment. The plaintiff 
misunderstands the Agreement. The Agreement provides 
that the decedents could not use said equipment any place 
except in the Lyric Theatre in Price, Utah, and that if they 
abandoned the Lyric Theatre they, at their own expense, 
"shall surrender and deliver up possession of the equip-
ment to the Company at its factory in good order and 
condition, - - - - -". The dec.edents,, upon abandoning the 
Lyric Theatre in the year 1937, became immediately oblig-
ed to ship said equipment to the plaintiff at its factory in 
New York City. The Agreement does not provide that the 
decedents could not abandon the Lyric Theatre, but pro-
vides only that if they did they shall return said equip-
ment to the plaintiff. The decedents did not breach the 
Agreement by abandoning the Lyric Theatre, but did 
breach the Agreement in 1937 when they did not immedi-
ately after abandoning said Theatre. return said equipment 
to the plaintiff. 
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Plaintiff argues that it has not been shown that the 
plaintiff knew that. the decedents abandoned the Lyric 
Theatre and therefore the Statute of Limitations did not 
start to run until the plaintiff learned of said fact. The 
Utah case of Dee vs. Hyland et al., 3 Utah 308, 3 Pac. 388, 
136 A. L. R. 659, holds that the statutes of limitations be-
gin to run from the time of the commission of the wrongful 
act, or when the right of action accrues, and not from the 
time of the knowledge of the act by the plaintiff. The Dee 
Case is a leading case on the subject and has been cited with 
. . 
approval by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Grisson et 
al vs. Beidleman et al., 129 P. 853; by the Supreme Court of 
Oregon in Hume v. Burns et al., 83· P. 391, al).d has also 
been cited with approval by other courts. 
The California Case of Rose vs. Dunk-Harbison Com-
pany, et al., 46 P. 2nd 242, reading from page 243 states: 
"As a rule, statutes of limitation commence to 
run when a cause of action is complete. There are 
well-recognized exceptions to the rule. But the fact 
that the injured party is without knowledge of the 
wrong committed, while bringing a case within the 
exceptions gener~lly recognized in cases of fraud 
and fraudulent concealment of facts, does not 
generally toll.the statute. A cause of action is not 
suspended merely because a party is ignorant of 
the fact that he has a cause of action or of 
the identity of the one who committed a certain 
act.· Lightner· Mining Co. vs. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 
120 P. 771, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1093; Lambert vs. 
McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 67 P. 6; Medley vs. Hill, 
104 Cal. App. 309, 285 P. 891." 
The general rule: is also stated in ah annotation in 136 
A. L. R. 658. 
In the light of the above authorities, we believe the 
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law to be as follows: 
1. That 'vhen "the plaintiff elected to terminate and 
did terminate said Agreemen.t", more than six years prior 
to the commencement of this action, that its cause of action 
accrued and the statutes of limitation immediately started 
to run. 
2. The statutes of limitation began to run on each of 
the Fifty 'Dollar installment payments when each of the 
same became due. None became due during the period 
more than six years immediately prior to the commence-
ment of the action because the plaintiff had terminated 
the Agreement and could not thereafter recover the rental 
installments ,as stated in the citation from 32 Am. Jur., 
Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 875, above quoted. 
3. In addition to the above matters, upon the aban-
donment of the Lyric Theatre in 1937, the decedents be-
came immediately obliged under the Agreement to return 
the equipment to the plaintiff. Decedents did not do so 
and a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff accrued at 
said time, both for the recovery of the possession of said 
equipment and for any damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
for the decedents' breach. In any event, the statutes of 
limitation had commenced to run against the plaintiff's 
cause of action at the time the plaintiff "elected to termi.;. 
nate and did terminate said Agreement" more than six 
years prior to the commencement of this action. This 
action was not commenced by the plaintiff until May 24th, 
1945. 
4. As above stated, in any event the Court has found 
that the plaintiff elected to terminate and did terminate its 
Agreement more than six years prior to the filing of its 
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Complaint and the finding is unassailable because the ap-
peal is . on the Judgment Roll, and this court cannot review 
the evidence. 
Plaintiff cannot recover in this case because its Com-
plaint does not state a cause of action. 
It is to be noted that the obligation of the decedents 
was to return the equipment to the plaintiff after the 
termination · of the said Agreement. Plaintiff does not 
bring this action to recover the possession of said equip-
ment. It brings the action for the sum of Three Thousand 
Dollars which it claims was the value of said equipment in 
the year 1941 at the end of the ten year period at which 
time the contract would have expired by its own terms 
had nothing else occurred in the meantime. We sub-
mit that the plaintiff's only action is for the recovery of 
the possession of the property. The only cause of action 
that the plaintiff had was for the recovery of the prop-
erty, or in the event recovery of the property could not be 
had, then for its value. The Complaint does not set forth 
a cause of action for the recovery of the property, and in 
the event that recovery cannot be had, then for its value. 
Plaintiff claims that when decedents did not return said 
property to the pl~intiff that the plaintiff had the right to 
bring an action for the value of the property. This is not 
the law. Counsel for plaintiff apparently believes that the 
I 
decedents and the defendants were guilty of a conversion 
of said property merely by not returning the same to the 
plaintiff. 
"Mere detention of another's chattels which 
rightfully came into one's possession is not an ac-
tionable conversion unle~ss based upon a negation 
of the owner's rights or acco:rppanied by an attempt 
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to convert the property to the holder's own use." 
- - - - - - "Demand and refusal are necessary for 
the maintenance of an action for conversion, in 
all cases in which defendant was rightfully in pos-
session." See Fletcher vs. Pump Creek Gas and 
Oil Syndicate 38 Wyo. 329; 266 P. 1062; 61 A. 
L. R. 615. 
We wish to point out to the Court that there are no alle-
gations in the plaintiff's Complaint covering these matters. 
The general rule of law on the subject is given in an 
annotation in 61 A. L. R. 621. It is as follows: 
"Generally speaking, where one is lawfully in pos-
session of the goods or chattels of another, and a 
demand on him for the delivery of the goods or 
chattels is made by or on behalf of the true owner, 
his mere detention of the property or failure or 
neglect to make delivery, without the performance 
of any express or affirmative act of conversion, 
does not amount to a conversion." 
The plaintiff does not state a cause of action . in 
trover or conversion because it does not plead any acts of 
decedents or defendants amounting to a conversion. There 
is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint of the performance 
by the decedents or defendants of any express or affirma ... 
tive act of conversion. 
A caus·e of action is not stated against the defend-
ants in this case _because of their inability to deliver said 
property to the plaintiff. S.ee annotation in 61 A. L. R. 628 
under the subject Inability to deliver. It states in part, as 
follows: 
"It is likewise held in cases in which one has been 
lawfully in possession of chattels, but is no longer 
in possession, due to no act of conversion on his 
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part, that a mere failure to deliver after a demand 
by or on behalf of the true owner is not such a de-
tention as will constitute a conversion." 
See Supplemental Annotation in_ 129 A. L. R. 638 on the 
subject of "Mere detention of or· failure to deliver chattels 
after demand as conversion." 
See also:-
Watkins vs. Jensen, 58 Utah 13, 197 P. 222; 
Nielsen vs .. Hyland, 51 Utah 334, 170 P. 778. 
In conclusion, we wish to state that the failure of the 
plaintiff to file a proper claim with the representatives of 
decedents by its failing to attach a copy of the contract to 
the purported claims presented is determinative of this 
case, and precludes plaintiff from any recovery herein. In 
addition to this point, we believe that the law on the balance 
of the case is also conclusively against the plaintiff. ·For 
the reasons hereinabove stated, the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DART & SHEYA 
Attorneys for James Cochran Littlejohn 
RUGGERI & GIBSON 
Attorneys for Naida L. Hyatt 
· Respondents. 
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